Margin calls at 41,000ft

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The three golden balls that still hang outside the odd pawnbroker’s shop are often traced back to the Lombards, the Italian moneylenders who gave their name to a street in the City of London. Their model was simple. You handed over something valuable and they lent you rather less than it was worth. Their model is simple, writes Oliver Scharping, senior adviser and private banker.

Private banks still use the name, with one refinement, which is that if the collateral falls they ask for more. (The premises are also nicer.)

The basic trade goes like this. You are rich and you would like a jet. You would rather not sell your shares, partly because selling may mean paying tax and partly because you like your shares. So you borrow against them. A Lombard loan, known in the US as securities-based lending, is quick and discreet, usually keenly priced, and puts no mortgage on any aircraft register. For a wealthy buyer it is a natural way to fund a jet, or at least the deposit.

Done well, it is one of the most useful tools a private bank offers. Done badly, it pledges the owner’s most volatile asset to buy a calmer one.

The collateral illusion

Look at the two assets as they stand this autumn. The pre-owned jet market is unusually tight: JETNET put inventory at about 6.6% of the fleet at mid-year, against 9-12% between 2014 and 2020. The equity market is the nervous one. The S&P 500 set fresh records in early October, but the Bank of England warned in July that the risk of a sharp correction was “high”. Rates are moving the wrong way too. The Fed raised rates in September for the first time since 2023, the 10-year Treasury yield touched its highest level since 2002, and Lombard credit priced off SOFR is no longer the near-free money of 2021.

Now run the numbers. Say you have a $60m portfolio, mostly in equities. The bank lends up to 60% of its value, so you have $36m of capacity, and you borrow $25m for a pre-owned large-cabin jet, leaving a comfortable-looking $11m of headroom. Then markets fall 30%, as they did in a little over a month in early 2020. The portfolio is worth $42m, capacity drops to $25.2m and your headroom is now $200,000.

If the bank also trims its lending value to 50% because volatility has jumped (and banks tend to do this at exactly that moment, which is rather the point), capacity falls to $21m. You now have to find $4m in cash, typically within two or three days, or sell about $8m of shares near the bottom, because every share you sell also shrinks the collateral. The bank will be extremely polite about all of this.

I call this the collateral illusion: a large portfolio looks like ample security until the day markets test it.

Alternatives don’t count

Family offices have a second problem, which is that the things they have spent a decade buying are not the things banks like to lend against. Diversified equities typically count for 40-60% of their value and high-grade bonds for more, but hedge funds and private-equity fund interests often count for nothing at all. UBS’s latest family office survey puts 42% of the average portfolio in alternatives. So the more sophisticated the portfolio, the less of it you can borrow against, which is a slightly awkward thing to discover halfway through buying a jet.

Asset-backed and boring

The alternative is to finance the aircraft against the aircraft. It is slower and involves more lawyers, and the lender will look hard at age, maintenance programme, registration and operator; some older jets will not finance on sensible terms at all. But the money is there. SVB, Credit Suisse and First Republic, all active private aircraft lenders, left the market in the spring of 2023, and specialists are filling the gap: three new jet lenders have launched this year, and Global Jet Capital’s ninth securitisation, $659m in June, was oversubscribed.

An aircraft lender will not ring you because the Nasdaq had a bad week. Its covenants mostly follow the aircraft, which this year has been the calmer of the two assets.

Belt and braces

The best answer is usually both: an asset-backed loan for the jet, and an undrawn Lombard line, sized to survive a crash, as a backstop for deposits, upgrades and surprises. Then stress-test the two together, with the family’s private-market capital calls alongside, as one liquidity problem. For brokers and buyers’ advisers, one question before closing is worth the awkwardness: what happens to this buyer’s funding if markets fall by a third?

The Lombards hung their golden balls outside the shop so that everybody knew what business they were in. Jet buyers should be just as clear about theirs. Owning an aircraft is one business. Running a leveraged bet on the stock market with a jet attached is quite another.

Oliver Scharping, Senior Advisor & Private Banker, is based in Monaco and is an adjunct professor at various European business schools. His recent research focuses on family-office governance. “The Collateral Illusion” is one of his current working papers.

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